The Constitutionality of States Extending Personhood to the Unborn by Walen, Alec
University of Minnesota Law School
Scholarship Repository
Constitutional Commentary
2005
The Constitutionality of States Extending
Personhood to the Unborn
Alec Walen
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/concomm
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the University of Minnesota Law School. It has been accepted for inclusion in Constitutional
Commentary collection by an authorized administrator of the Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact lenzx009@umn.edu.
Recommended Citation
Walen, Alec, "The Constitutionality of States Extending Personhood to the Unborn" (2005). Constitutional Commentary. 52.
https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/concomm/52
THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF STATES 
EXTENDING PERSONHOOD TO THE 
UNBORN 
Alec Walen* 
In 1992, Ronald Dworkin made a provocative argument 
that states cannot be given the liberty to declare fetuses to be 
persons.1 The argument can be represented as follows: Federal 
constitutional law recognizes a fundamental liberty interest in 
controlling "whether to bear or beget a child. "2 This liberty in-
terest in choosing whether to bear a child implies that women 
have a legal right to choose whether to have an abortion unless 
the state has a compelling interest to the contrary. States have a 
compelling interest to the contrary if and only if either unborn 
humans are persons under the federal Constitution, or states can 
declare them to be, in effect, persons with rights under state law. 
Unborn humans are not persons under the federal Constitution. 
Moreover, if states had the power to declare unborn humans to 
be, in effect, persons in whose welfare they could take a compel-
ling interest, they would thereby have the power to undermine 
federally protected constitutional rights. Such a power would be 
inconsistent with the supremacy of federal law. As Dworkin put 
it: "If a fetus is not part of the constitutional population, under 
the national constitutional arrangement, then states have no 
power to overrule that national arrangement by themselves de-
claring that fetuses have rights competitive with the constitu-
tional rights of pregnant women. "3 
• Alec Walen is an associate professor of Philosophy at the University of Balti-
more. I would like to thank Fred Schauer, Lawrence Solum, Jacqueline Ross, Thomas 
Ulen, Dennis McGrath, Tom Curley, Eric Compton and Jim Chen, my editor at Constitu-
tional Commentary, for their comments on earlier drafts. 
!. Ronald Dworkin, Unenumerated Rights: Whether and How Roe Should be 
Overruled, 59 U. On. L. REv. 381,400-01 (1992). The argument is repeated in RONALD 
DWORKIN, LIFE'S DOMINION: AN ARGUMENT ABOUT ABORTION, EUTHANASIA, AND 
INDIVIDUAL FREEDOM 113-14 (1993). 
2. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972). 
3. Dworkin, Unenumerated Rights, supra note 1, at 401. 
161 
162 CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY [Vol. 22:161 
This argument is no mere academic exercise. It was quoted 
at some length, that same year, by Justice Stevens in his concur-
ring opinion in Planned Parenthood v. Casey.4 Justice Stevens 
quoted the argument in a note following his assertion that "as a 
matter of federal constitutional law, a developing organism that 
is not yet a 'person' does not have what is sometimes described 
as a 'right to life. "'5 Given that Dworkin's argument does not 
support, but rather rests on, Justice Stevens's claim about federal 
constitutional law, Justice Stevens presumably offered it not as 
support for his claim about federal law, but as a warning to those 
who would suggest that states could unilaterally choose to de-
clare unborn humans to be persons. Justice Stevens presumably 
meant to endorse the thought that states cannot "increase the 
constitutional population by unilateral decision [and thereby] 
decrease rights the national Constitution grants to others. "6 
Although it has been fourteen years since Dworkin pub-
lished this argument and Justice Stevens cited it, no one has yet 
subjected the argument to detailed critical analysis.7 The argu-
ment, however, should not be ignored. It may well come back 
into play as states, as well as the federal government, are passing 
laws that recognize unborn humans as persons for purposes 
other than restricting abortions. On April 1, 2004, President 
Bush signed into federal law the "Unborn Victims of Violence 
Act of 2004," making the killing of an unborn person (other than 
as part of an abortion sought by a woman) a crime punishable as 
if a born person had been killed (with the exception that the 
death penalty is not available).8 A number of states have re-
cently pursued basically the same legal strategy. For example, 
Texas's "Prenatal Protection Act," extends the protections of 
the entire criminal code to "an unborn child at every stage of 
gestation from fertilization until birth."9 Utah's criminal law, 
4. 505 U.S. 833,913 n.2 (1992) (Stevens, J., concurring). 
5. /d. at 913. 
6. I d. at 913 n.2 (quoting Dworkin, Unenumerated Rights, supra note 1, at 400). 
7. The most extensive analysis I have seen was provided by Richard Posner, Legal 
Reasoning from the Top Down and from the Bottom Up: The Question of Unenumerated 
Constitutional Rights, 59 U. CHI. L. REv. 433,444 (1992). But this analysis was given in a 
symposium put on by the University of Chicago, in which both Dworkin and Posner par-
ticipated, and Dworkin has already taken it into account in his original piece. 
8. 18 U.S.C.A. § 1841 (West 2006). 
9. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. §§ 1.07 (a)(26), 19.06 (1) and 19.06 (2) (2003). This 
law does not, however, apply to "conduct committed by the mother of the unborn child," 
to "a lawful medical procedure performed by a physician or other licensed health care 
provider with the requisite consent," or to "a lawful medical procedure performed by a 
physician or other licensed health care provider with the requisite consent as part of as-
sisted reproduction." /d.§§ 19.06 (1)-(3). 
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with an exception carved out for abortion, treats the killing of an 
"unborn child" at any stage of pre-natal development like any 
other homicide.10 In addition, with exceptions carved out for 
abortions, 18 other states have laws that criminalize killing un-
born humans from conception onwards, and seven other states 
have laws that criminalize killing unborn humans starting some 
time after conception but before viability. 11 Some states are even 
contemplating laws that directly challenge, for all purposes, the 
claim in Roe that unborn humans deserve fewer basic protec-
tions than born humans. For example, South Carolina's legisla-
ture is considering, at the time of this writing, a bill entitled the 
"Right to Life Act of South Carolina." According to this bill, 
"The right to due process, whereby no person may be deprived 
of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, and the 
right to equal protection of the laws, both of which rights are 
guaranteed by ... the Constitution of this State, vest at fertiliza-
tion."12 
Laws of this sort could become the predicate for states and 
the federal government to challenge the claim in Roe v. Wade 
that "the unborn have never been recognized in the law as per-
sons in the whole sense."13 Dworkin's argument, if sound, would 
deny states, as well as the federal government, the power to pur-
sue this avenue for challenging Roe. My claim here is that 
Dworkin's argument does not actually help defend Roe. Rather, 
it presupposes what it purports to support-namely, that states, 
and the federal government, are constitutionally barred from 
recognizing unborn humans as persons with rights. As a result, it 
begs the question. As a further result, the substantive holding of 
Roe- that women have a fundamental right to choose an abor-
tion- is in greater jeopardy than is generally acknowledged. 
10. UTAH CODE ANN.§ 76-5-201 (1)(a)-(b) (West 2005). 
II. S~e _National Right to Life Committee, State Homicide Laws That Recognize 
l!~bom VIctims, http://www.nrlc.org/Unbom_ Victims/Statehomicidelaws092302.html (last 
VISited Mar. 9, 2006). For a general discussion of the possibility of using legal protection of 
the fetus to undermine Roe, see Aaron Wagner, Texas Two-Step: Serving up Fetal Rights 
by Side-Stepping Roe v. Wade Has Set the Table for Another Showdown on Fetal Person-
hood in Texas and Beyond, 32 TEx. TECH L. REV. 1085 (2001). 
12. South Carolina General Assembly, 115th Session, 2005-2006, available at 
http://www.scstatehouse.net/sessl16_2005-2006/bills/3213.htm (last visited Mar. 9, 2006). 
13. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 162 (1973). 
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I. ROE AND THE STATUS OF 
UNBORN HUMAN LIFE 
To appreciate how changes in state and federal law, provid-
ing greater protection to the unborn, could undermine the sub-
stantive holding of Roe, it is necessary to revisit the argument in 
Roe. Roe, at its core, is based on two premises. The first is that 
women have a fundamental liberty interest in controlling 
whether to beget and bear children; the second is that states do 
not have a compelling interest sufficient to override the woman's 
liberty interest. Many critics, including the two original dissent-
ers in Roe, Justices Rehnquist and White, have assailed Roe's 
first premise. But I believe Dworkin is right. Roe's first premise 
is solidly grounded in a wide range of uncontroversial Supreme 
Court opinions.14 As a matter of constitutional law, Roe's second 
premise is more controversial. 
The second premise, that states do not have a compelling in-
terest sufficient to override a woman's liberty interest, turns on 
two further claims: first, that unborn humans are not persons 
under constitutional law, and second, that states do not have a 
compelling interest in protecting unborn human life, at least not 
until it reaches the stage of viability. The first claim seems suffi-
ciently well supported by three kinds of reasons relied on in Roe 
itself. First, insofar as the text of the Constitution offers any evi-
dence of what counts as a person, it treats them as "born" per-
sons, and no case has ever treated an unborn human as a person 
under the Fourteenth Amendment.15 The Fourteenth Amend-
ment starts: "All persons born or naturalized in the United 
States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the 
United States and of the State wherein they reside." 16 The impli-
14. Roe itself starts by grounding the right to privacy, citing Union Pacific R. Co. v. 
Botsford, 141 U.S. 250, 251 (1891); Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 564 (1969) (First 
Amendment); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 8-9 (1968) (Fourth and Fifth Amendments); 
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347,350 (1967) (same); Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 
616 (1886) (same); Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438,478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dis-
senting) (same); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479,484-85 (1965) (penumbras of the 
Bill of Rights or the Ninth Amendment); and Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 
(1923) (the concept of liberty guaranteed by the first section of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment). 410 U.S. at 152. Roe then cites a number of cases to demonstrate the range of ac-
tivities for which the privacy right had been deemed fundamental: Loving v. Virginia, 388 
U.S. 1, 12 (1967) (marriage); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535,541-42 (1942) (procrea-
tion); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453--54, 460, 463--65 (1972) (contraception); 
Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944) (family relationships); Pierce v. Society 
of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 535 (1925) (child rearing and education); and Meyer v. Nebraska, 
262 U.S. at 399 (same). 410 U.S. at 152-53. 
15. See Roe, 410 U.S. at 157. 
16. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV,§ 1, cited in Roe, 410 U.S. at 157 (emphasis added). 
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cation is that there are two routes to citizenship: birth and natu-
ralization. It might be suggested that citizenship depends on 
birth, but that personhood status does not. Were that true, the 
Privileges and Immunities clause, which protects citizens of the 
United states, would protect only those who are born, while the 
Due Process and Equal Protection clauses, which protect per-
sons generally, would apply even to the unborn.17 This, however, 
is clearly an implausible reading. There is no reason to distin-
guish these clauses in terms of the born and the unborn. The dif-
ference between these clauses is much more plausibly inter-
preted by reading the Due Process and Equal Protection clauses 
as providing an extra level of protection to citizens, who form a 
subset of persons, that is, born humans. 
A second reason to think the unborn are not persons under 
the Constitution is that, from the drafting of the Constitution to 
the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment, abortion was toler-
ated to a degree inconsistent with the belief that constitutional 
protections were afforded to the unborn. 18 Arguably, under a 
framework different from that articulated in Roe, abortion can 
be justified in a fairly wide range of cases, even if the unborn 
humans who are killed have the legal status of born persons.19 If 
that is correct, then it cannot be argued that abortion was toler-
ated to a degree actually inconsistent with the unborn having the 
status of persons. But it would still make sense to say that, since 
most people would have (wrongly) thought abortion should be 
unavailable if the unborn were persons, the fact that abortion 
was generally available indicates the people did not conceive of 
the unborn as persons. 
A third reason to think the unborn are not persons under 
the Constitution is that the rights of unborn humans under the 
law in general at the time of Roe was inconsistent with their hav-
ing the status of persons under the Constitution. Even Texas, the 
state whose law was directly challenged in Roe, did not treat the 
killing of unborn humans as on a par with the killing of born per-
sons. As the Roe Court noted, it is difficult to reconcile the claim 
17. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV,§ 1 ("No State shall make or enforce any Jaw which 
shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any 
State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny 
to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." (emphases added)). 
18. I believe it was largely to make this point that Justice Blackmun engaged in his 
long, historical exploration of abortion. See Roe, 410 U.S. at 129--39. 
19. See, e.g., Alec Walen, ConsensUJJ/ Sex Without Assuming the Risk of Carrying an 
Unwanted Fetus; Another Foundation for the Right to an Abonion, 63 BROOK. L. REV. 
1051 (1997). 
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that unborn humans are persons under the Fourteenth Amend-
ment with the fact that Texas, along with most other states, al-
lowed abortions to save the life of the mother. "[I]f the fetus is a 
person who is not to be deprived of life without due process of 
law, and if the mother's condition is the sole determinant, does 
not the Texas exception appear to be out of line with the 
Amendment's command?"20 This point may be less telling than 
the Court thought. Arguably, in the battle between two inno-
cents, only one of whom can survive, the state could choose to 
side with the mother. But the Court followed up with a more 
persuasive point. It noted that "in Texas the woman is not a 
principal or an accomplice with respect to an abortion upon 
her."2 In cases where her life is not at risk, if she is not thought 
to have a right to an abortion, and if the fetus is a person, then 
"why is the woman not a principal or an accomplice [in its mur-
der]?"22 
The second claim, that states do not have a compelling in-
terest in protecting human life from conception onward, is more 
problematic. To understand it correctly, we need to distinguish 
the two ways the Court approached this issue. First, the Court 
considered what was essentially a metaphysical claim, that hu-
man life from conception onward has a status such that states 
have a compelling interest in protecting it. Second, the Court ex-
amined legal practice to see whether states consistently treat the 
unborn as legal persons.23 
The Court refused to endorse the metaphysical claim, be-
cause there has long been and continues to be disagreement be-
tween "those trained in the respective disciplines of medicine, 
philosophy, and theology" as to the question whether life, in the 
relevant senses, "begins at conception."24 Noting this disagree-
ment, the Court concluded that it "is not in a position to specu-
late as to the answer."25 The Court could have left Texas to 
make its own metaphysical judgment. But there is some sense in 
its refusal to do so. Given that a fundamental liberty interest 
20. 410 U.S. at 157 n.54. 
21. /d. 
22. /d. 
23. Logically a third option is available, namely that states could have a compelling 
interest in fetal life or in preventing abortion that is not grounded in the legal status of 
the fetus. For example, the state might claim a compelling interest in promoting respect 
for human life in general. Such a move would presumably face the same challenges as the 
move to treat fetuses as persons under the law, and I therefore leave it to the side. 
24. 410 U.S. at 159. 
25. ld. 
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hangs in the balance, the Court could not simply accept a claim 
about the status of human life without assessing it. If, however, 
the Court were to accept that, in some metaphysically relevant 
sense, "life begins at conception," then it would have to apply 
that claim generally. A metaphysical claim cannot be true for 
Texas but false for, say, New York. Texas can choose to take a 
metaphysical stand in a way that New York would not?6 But 
again, a fundamental liberty interest hangs in the balance here. 
The Court could credit Texas's position as giving it a compelling 
reason to limit a woman's right to abortion only if it could credit 
Texas's claim that life begins at conception as true. That, how-
ever, would be inconsistent with also allowing New York to deny 
that life begins at conception. Thus, by arguing that life begins at 
conception, Texas was taking a stand much like the stand it took 
in arguing that fetuses are persons under the Fourteenth 
Amendment. The implications of accepting Texas's argument 
would be too strong, too limiting of the freedom of other states. 
Declaring the metaphysical status of human life from con-
ception onward legally out of bounds, the Court turned to legal 
practice with regard to unborn human life. It looked to see 
whether the law "endorse[ d] any theory that life, as we recognize 
it, begins before life [sic] birth or ... accord[ed] legal rights to 
the unborn except in narrowly defined situations and except 
when the rights are contingent upon life [sic] birth. "27 The Court 
found that the answer was no. It then concluded that "the un-
born have never been recognized in the law as persons in the 
whole sense. "28 
26. It is an interesting question whether a state can take a controversial metaphysi-
cal position, and ground criminal laws on that basis, without violating the restrictions the 
Court enunciated in Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003). Reviewing a Texas law mak-
ing same-sex sodomy a crime, the Court noted that condemnation of sodomy "has been 
shaped by religious beliefs, conceptions of right and acceptable behavior, and respect for 
the traditional family." Id. at 571. The Court did not dismiss the relevance of these 
sources of moral and ethical guidance for individuals. But it held that the issue for the 
Constitution "is whether the majority may use the power of the State to enforce these 
views on the whole society through operation of the criminal law." Id. It answered this 
question in the negative. One could read this holding as implying that religious, and pre-
sumably metaphysical, beliefs cannot be the ground for criminal law. But, of course, the 
state must appeal to some sort of political morality to ground its laws, and arguably po-
litical morality cannot remain neutral on questions such as "What is a person?" This issue 
engages the debate concerning public reason and perfectionism, which is one of the cen-
tral debates in contemporary political theory. It is therefore completely beyond the scope 
of this paper. For an overview of the debate, see WILL KYMLICKA, CONTEMPORARY 
POLmCAL PHILOSOPHY: AN INTRODUCilON (2001), especially chapter 6. 
27. 410 U.S. at 161. 
28. Id. at 162. 
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Critically, the Court did not deny that Texas could have had 
a set of laws by which it "endorsed" a theory that life, for legal 
purposes, begins before birth. It did not deny that Texas could 
"accord" legal rights to the unborn in a wide range of circum-
stances, not contingent upon live birth. In other words, it did not 
deny that there are circumstances under which Texas could 
choose to take a compelling interest in the life of unborn hu-
mans. What it said, in essence, is that Texas, like the rest of the 
United States, does not, in fact, treat unborn humans as persons 
with rights. Were Texas to reform the way it treats the unborn in 
general, it could revisit the issue, and the Court would then have 
no legal basis for denying that Texas has a compelling interest in 
protecting the life of the unborn. 
It could be objected that the Court in Roe did take a stand 
on when states have a compelling interest in fetal life, namely 
when fetuses become viable. The Court chose viability "because 
the fetus then presumably has the capability of meaningful life 
outside the mother's womb. "29 The Court then claimed that it 
followed that "[s ]tate regulation protective of fetal life after vi-
ability ... has both logical and biological justifications. "30 
The question is, are there really logical and biological justi-
fications for saying that states have a compelling interest in fetal 
life at viability, and not sooner or later? The Court offers noth-
ing to back up that claim. But it might seem plausible enough 
that viability is the important place to draw the line because it is 
the point after which a woman's interest in terminating a preg-
nancy and a fetus's interest in life can, at least in theory, both be 
accommodated. If a woman wants to terminate her pregnancy at 
that point, she normally could do so without the fetus having to 
die. But there are two reasons to doubt that viability really 
marks a logical and biological turning point. One reason has to 
do with the actual practical significance of viability for women 
who might want an abortion. The other reason has to do with the 
moral status of a fetus as it develops. 
Turning first to the pragmatic issue, there is reason to doubt 
that a woman could abort her pregnancy in such a way to keep a 
viable fetus alive without extra costs to her. The obvious meth-
ods for ending a pregnancy early without killing the fetus all 
have their risks. Chemical induction of premature labor requires 
29. !d. at 163. 
30. !d. 
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constant monitoring, and only takes place in hospital settings.31 
Hysterotomies are considered major surgery and are very rarely 
used.32 And using the technique of dilation and extraction, with-
out collapsing the fetus's head, would require more dilation of 
the cervix than would typically be required for a dilation and ex-
traction abortion in which the fetus's head is collapsed, with as-
sociated risks from extra artificial dilation.33 This raises the ques-
tion whether a woman who carries a potentially viable fetus and 
who wants to end her pregnancy could be legally required to un-
dergo one of these procedures to maximize the chance that a live 
birth would result. The answer seems to be no. The case law 
from Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians and Gy-
necologisti4 to Stenberg v. Carharf5 makes it clear that abortion 
procedures cannot be banned, nor others required, if the result 
would be to endanger the health of women seeking an abortion, 
even after fetal viability. The only question these cases leave 
open is whether these holdings apply to cases in which a woman 
seeks an abortion for reasons unrelated to her own health, such 
as the discovery that the fetus has some sort of birth defect?6 If 
these holdings do not extend to such "elective" reasons for an 
abortion, then arguably states have a freer hand. If a woman has 
no health-based reasons to have an abortion, and she seeks an 
abortion when her fetus is at least potentially viable, and the 
state could require her either to carry the fetus to term or to end 
her pregnancy only in a way that would protect the potential for 
live birth, then viability would have some practical significance.37 
But it is unclear if the Court would read its prior cases that way, 
and thus unclear if the Court really does appreciate the prag-
matic "logic" of viability. 
31. See Planned Parenthood Fed'n of Am. v. Ashcroft, 320 F. Supp. 2d 957, 963 
(N.D. Cal. 2004) (discussing various forms of mid to late term abortions and their health 
risks, based on the testimony of numerous medical experts). 
32. See id. 
33. See id. at 989 (describing the risk of dilation). Note, however, that some medical 
authorities claim that there is no reason that live births could not generally be provided 
as easily as an abortion for viable fetuses. See excerpts of the Congressional Hearings on 
the Partial Birth Abortion Ban Act, available at http://www.nrlc.org/abortion/pbal 
pbafact13. html (last visited Mar. 9, 2006). 
34. 476 u.s. 747 (1986). 
35. 530 u.s. 914 (2000). 
36. Amniocentesis to determine whether a fetus has birth defects that could give 
parents a reason to abort a pregnancy is usually done from 15 to 18 weeks of gestational 
development. See, e.g., http://my.webmd.com/hw/being_pregnant/hw1810.asp (last visited 
Mar. 9, 2006). But amniocentesis can be done later in term, and there is no reason to 
think that some women will not discover a birth defect using that, or some other, test 
only after the fetus is viable. 
37. See Carhan, 530 U.S. at 1010 (Thomas, J. dissenting). 
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Even if the pragmatic logic of viability would be respected 
by the Court, it makes analytic sense to distinguish the question 
of when a state has a compelling interest in fetal life, because of 
its own moral status, from when the state can effectively do 
something to protect both fetal life and a woman's right to de-
cide whether to bear a child. Focusing on the fetus alone, it 
would make as much if not more biological sense to draw the 
line at when it becomes conscious (and can feel pain),38 or when 
it becomes a single indivisible entity,39 or when it starts to de-
velop as a life of its own (that is, from conception forward), than 
to draw the line at when it can live outside the womb. I am not 
suggesting that the Court should have relied on any of these 
points in development in place of viability. The moral relevance 
of all of these points can be debated,40 and just as I think the 
Court was right to refuse to take a stand on the metaphysics of 
personhood, I think it should not have tried to settle this kind of 
moral debate. But that does not mean that the Court can defend 
using the viability line as grounded in "biological justifications" 
either. 
Given that viability has no real "biological" significance, it 
seems that the most charitable way to read the Court's decision 
to draw a line at viability is to read the Court as moved by the 
38. The point at which fetuses become sentient is the point in development at which 
Dworkin would consider fetuses to acquire rights. He argues that before that point, fe-
tuses cannot have interests and therefore cannot have rights. See DWORKIN, LIFE'S 
DOMINION, supra note 1,at 16-19. Some have theorized that fetuses can feel pain as early 
as 13 weeks into gestation. See, e.g., Vivette Glover & Nicholas M. Fisk, Fetal Pain: Im-
plications for Research and Practice, 106 BRIT. J. OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 881, 882 
(1999). But the consensus view is that the ability to feel pain arises later in development. 
See National Abortion Fed'n v. Ashcroft, 330 F. Supp. 2d 436, 443 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (cit-
ing expert testimony that the onset of fetal ability to feel pain is 20 weeks); Planned Par-
enthood Fed'n of Am. v. Ashcroft, 320 F. Supp. 2d 957, 997-99 (N.D. Cal. 2004) (citing 
expert testimony that the onset of fetal ability to feel pain is between 22 and 26 weeks). 
This period from 20-26 weeks overlaps with the period at which fetuses are now consid-
ered viable. ("A fetus is generally viable between twenty-three and twenty-four weeks 
from the first day of the woman's last menstrual period." Nat'l Abortion Fed'n, 330 F. 
Supp. 2d at 440 n.3.) Further research, however, may show that the onset of fetal ability 
to feel pain is either a few weeks earlier or a few weeks later than when most fetuses are 
viable. Moreover, the ability to support fetuses outside the womb may reach earlier into 
pregnancy as technology develops; the time it take for a fetus to develop the ability to 
feel pain is fixed as a matter of biology. 
39. Embryos become single, indivisible entities when the possibility of "twinning" 
ceases, at around 14 days into development. See THE PREsiDENT'S CoUNCIL ON 
BIOETHICS, HUMAN O..ONING AND HUMAN DIGNITY: AN ETIIICAL INQUIRY 136 (2002), 
available at http://www.bioethics.gov/reports/cloningreportlindex.htrnl (last visited April 3, 
2006). 
40. For a discussion of the problems inherent in appealing to the criterion Dworkin 
invokes, the ability to have conscious experience, see DAVID BOONIN, A DEFENSE OF 
ABORTION 116-22 (2003). 
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pragmatic logic of viability. The Court presumably believed that 
by drawing a line at viability it could give the states some room 
to take a compelling interest in the life of unborn humans, and 
yet it could protect women's fundamental liberty interest in con-
trolling their reproduction. But the analytic framework for this 
pragmatic logic is confused. It makes more analytic sense to dis-
tinguish when a state has a compelling interest in fetal life from 
when it can do something about that interest without infringing 
on a woman's liberty interests. Thus the pragmatic logic of vi-
ability in Roe does not provide a solid basis for resisting the 
claim that states can take a compelling interest in the lives of the 
unborn if they choose to treat the unborn as persons in the 
whole sense. 
II. IS ROE REALLY THREATENED? 
Some may think that, in reality, there is no need to worry 
about states undermining Roe. States, it may seem, are not about 
to treat the unborn as persons "in the whole sense." Even the re-
cent Unborn Victims of Violence Act, despite generally treating 
the killing of a fetus as on a par with the killing of a born person, 
makes some exceptions. For one thing, the death penalty is not 
available for killing a fetus,41 though it is sometimes available for 
killing a born person. More significantly, it is clear that it would 
be nearly politically impossible for even the most socially con-
servative states to enact laws declaring, should Roe be reversed, 
that they will prosecute women who have abortions for murder. 
At first blush, this seems to be an important limit on the an-
tiabortion agenda. If some states want to argue that their prac-
tice is now inconsistent with the claim in Roe that "the unborn 
have never been recognized in the law as persons in the whole 
sense,"
42 then they must not give women who seek abortions a 
free pass. They may be able to recognize certain circumstances-
say those in which a woman's pregnancy threatens her life or 
health43 -in which a woman is justified in having an abortion 
even if the unborn human she carries has the legal status of a 
41. See18 U.S.C.A. § 1841(a)(2)(D) (West 2004). 
42. 410 u.s. 113, 162 (1973). 
43. These are circumstances they may have to embrace if the argument is that they 
have a compelling interest in protecting the life of the unborn, since Roe does not allow 
states to prohibit abortions that are necessary for the life or health of a woman even if 
her fetus is viable, that is, even if the state has a compelling interest in its health. See id. 
at 163--64. If, however, Roe's substantive holding were reversed, there is little reason to 
think that the health exception would be legally sacrosanct. 
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person. But in general, to undermine Roe's finding that states 
don't treat fetus as persons in the whole sense, states would have 
to rebut the rhetorical question framed in Roe: "If the fetus is a 
person, why is the woman [who seeks an abortion] not [crimi-
nally liable as] a principal or an accomplice (to a murder]?"44 
The fact that not even the most conservative state is likely 
to be politically ready any time soon to prosecute women who 
seek abortions as principals or accomplices to murder does not, 
however, show that Roe is on firm ground. Socially conservative 
states that want to claim that they are ready to treat unborn hu-
mans as persons in the whole sense can plausibly explain why 
they would not prosecute women as harshly for seeking an abor-
tion as they would prosecute a third party for performing one.45 
They might start by marking an analogy between abortions and 
suicides. No state currently prosecutes those who attempt sui-
cide.46 But they all, with a narrowly drawn exception in Ore-
gon,47 do prosecute those who assist suicide. Indeed, the Model 
Penal Code suggests that assisting suicide should be a felony. 48 
The analogy, of course, is not perfect. For one thing, presumably 
someone willing to kill himself cannot be deterred with threats; 
presumably, however, most women who consider abortions can 
be deterred with threats. But at a more general level, the anal-
ogy is apt. A state might with reason choose to focus its prosecu-
torial resources on those who would be serially involved in abor-
tions, namely the abortion providers, and leave individual 
women who seek abortions subject to lesser charges. Moreover, 
states could argue that women should be subject to lesser penal-
ties because carrying an unwanted pregnancy may constitute 
something like duress.49 
44. !d. at 157 n.54. 
45. I am indebted to Dennis McGrath for pressing me on this point. 
46. For rather obvious reasons, no state can prosecute someone for a successful sui-
cide. Such prosecutions used to occur, but the punishment was meted out only to the "es-
tate," i.e. the family of the suicide. All states eventually came to recognize that this was 
unfair. See Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702,713 (1997). 
47. See Oregon's Death with Dignity Act, OR. REV. STAT.§ 127.800 (2003). 
48. "A person who purposely aids or solicits another to commit suicide is guilty of a 
felony of the second degree if his conduct causes such suicide or an attempted suicide, 
and otherwise of a misdemeanor." Model Penal Code§ 210.5(2) (Official Draft andRe-
vised Comments 1980). 
49. But cf Whitner v. State, 492 S.E.2d 777, 778 (S.C. 1997) (upholding a conviction 
for criminal child neglect against a mother for taking cocaine during pregnancy); Nancy 
K. Schiff, Legislation Punishing Drug Use During Pregnancy: Attack on Women'~ Rights 
in the Name of Fetal Protection, 19 HAsTINGS CaNST. L.Q. 197 (1991) (reportmg that 
mothers are being held criminally liable for harm they do to their babies in utero; focus-
ing specifically on states such as Colorado, Georgia, Louisiana, and Ohio that have al-
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In addition, for some states, if they see criminalizing a 
woman's choice to get an abortion as the key to escaping the 
constraints of Roe, they may be willing to indicate a willingness 
to do so as soon as the Supreme Court would allow them to do 
so. It is also unclear exactly how far a state would have to go to 
challenge the claim that it does not take a compelling interest in 
the life of unborn humans. Does it really have to treat unborn 
humans as persons "in the whole sense" in order to take a com-
pelling interest in their lives? Perhaps it would be sufficient if it 
treated them as persons in most regards. Perhaps Texas has not 
yet gone far enough, but if pro-life forces continue to be domi-
nant in the legislature, it may go that far in the next few years. 
Thus Dworkin's argument that states cannot overrule a national 
constitutional right is not merely an academic exercise. 
III. DWORKIN'S ARGUMENT TO 
FILL THE GAP IN ROE 
Dworkin's argument is meant to shore up Roe at this point 
where its rationale is most contingent. It is meant to show why 
states cannot escape Roe's holding by taking a different attitude 
towards fetuses in general and claiming on that basis a right to 
impose new, perhaps strict, limits on abortions. 
Recall that Dworkin's position is that if states could simply 
declare that fetuses were persons with rights, they would thereby 
"overrule" nationally guaranteed constitutional rights. Because 
of the supremacy of federal law over state law, states lack this 
power. Indeed, because of the supremacy of constitutional law 
over statutory law, even Congress may lack this power, except 
insofar as it plays its constitutional role, granted to it in Article 
V, in amending the Constitution. 
With regard to the power of Congress, the Court in Boerne 
v. Flores50 ruled that Congress cannot interpret the Constitution 
in a way that contradicts the Court's interpretation and use that 
interpretation to undermine a Court ruling about how to balance 
state power and individual rights. "[C]ongress does not enforce a 
constitutional right by changing what the right is."51 In the same 
spirit, it is clear that Congress could not overrule the Court's 
ready made it a felony to give birth to a drug·addicted child). See generally Dorothy E. 
Roberts, Punishing Drug Addicts Who Have Babies: Women of Color, Equality, and the 
Right of Privacy, 104 HARV. L. REV. 1419 (1991). 
50. 521 U.S. 507 (1997). 
51. /d. at 508. 
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holding that unborn humans are not persons under the Four-
teenth Amendment. At most, Congress could declare unborn 
humans to be persons under federal statutory and regulatory 
law.52 But again, if Dworkin's argument is correct, Congress can 
no more declare unborn humans to be persons in a way that 
would "overrule" nationally guaranteed constitutional rights 
than states can. 
Taking Dworkin's argument, then, to apply to both the 
states and Congress, the question is whether it works. An obvi-
ous objection to Dworkin's argument is that it is inconsistent 
with powers the states clearly do have. As Richard Posner put it: 
[S]tates are allowed to decide what is property and (in the 
case of prisoners for example) what is liberty, for purposes of 
the Due Process Clause; why not what is a person? Can't a 
state decide that death means brain death rather than a 
stopped heart? And if it can decide when life ends why can't it 
decide when life begins?53 
Dworkin has a fairly convincing reply to this objection. 
States are not free to define such things at will. A state could 
not, for example, "change constitutional rights by its decisions 
about when . . . death happens. "54 A state "cannot escape its 
constitutional responsibilities to death-row prisoners by declar-
ing them already dead, or improve its congressional representa-
tion by declaring deceased citizens still alive for that purpose."55 
52. Even if Congress were to use its power to declare unborn humans to be persons 
under federal statutory and regulatory law, much of the action in abortion rights would 
still be at the state level. After Boerne, it is clear that Congress cannot use its enforce-
ment power under section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment to enforce or protect rights 
that the Court does not recognize. See Nevada Dep't of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 
721,729 (2003) ("Section 5 legislation reaching beyond the scope of§ 1's actual guaran-
tees must be an appropriate remedy for identified constitutional violations, not an at-
tempt to substantively redefine the States' legal obligations.") (internal quotation omit-
ted). Thus Congress would be limited to using the commerce clause or the spending 
power to restrict abortions. The commerce clause, however, would allow Congress to 
restrict abortions only insofar as they take place in or affect interstate commerce; an area 
that is presumably fairly small. See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 608-19 
(2000); see also Allan Ides, The Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act of 2003 and the Com-
merce Clause, 20 CONST. COMMENT. 441 (2004). The spending power is superficially 
broader, allowing Congress to withhold federal funds from states that do not do what 
Congress wants. There are limits, however, on how Congress may condition state access 
to federal funds: "Such conditions must (among other requirements) bear some relation-
ship to the purpose of the federal spending, otherwise, of course, the spending power 
could render academic the Constitution's other grants and limits of federal authority." 
New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144,167 (1992) (internal citation omitted). 
53. Posner, supra note 7, at 444. 
54. Dworkin, Unenumerated Rights, supra note 1, at 402. 
55. /d. 
2005] PERSONHOOD FOR THE UNBORN 175 
Indeed, imagine that a state wanted to declare prisoners dead 
upon sentencing. That would unacceptably undermine their right 
of appeal, not to mention their right to be free from cruel and 
unusual punishment while in prison awaiting execution. Consti-
tutional law obviously has some implicit commitments regarding 
what counts as being alive and what counts as being dead. States 
may be free to define death at the margins, but not in a way that 
undermines the basic constitutional commitments. 
The question in the abortion context is whether the Consti-
tution not only has implicit commitments to women's liberty to 
control reproduction, but also has commitments to excluding 
unborn, pre-viable humans from the category of beings in whose 
welfare states can take a compelling interest. As we have seen, 
the problem with Roe is that it does not provide any reason for 
thinking the Constitution is so categorically inhospitable to pre-
viable humans. And here is the problem with Dworkin's argu-
ment: it trades on what it is meant to shore up. His argument 
works only if it is independently clear that the Constitution is 
best interpreted to entail that unborn human life cannot be 
treated on a par with born human life. But that is exactly what is 
not clear. 
In Dworkin's defense, the Constitution does implicitly con-
tain some limits on what can count as a person. As Dworkin 
notes, states are not free to make corporations persons with a 
right to vote.56 Though the Constitution nowhere sets down a 
positive right to vote-it lists only certain bases upon which citi-
zens shall not be denied the right to vote: {1) race, color, or pre-
vious condition of servitude;57 {2). sex;58 (3) "by reason of failure 
to pay any poll tax or other tax"; 9 and ( 4) age (provided one has 
reached age 18)60 - it is clear from structure of the Constitution 
as a whole that the right to vote, at least in federal elections, is 
meant to be had by individual citizens, not artificial corporate 
"persons." Were states to add corporations to the category of 
persons with a right to vote, they would thereby unconstitution-
56. DWORKIN, LIFE'S DOMINION, supra note 1, at 114. 
57. U.S. CONST. amend. XV. 
58. U.S. CONST. amend. XIX. 
59. U.S. CONST. amend. XXIV. This amendment applies to the right to vote in fed-
eral elections. The Court declared the citizens cannot be denied the right to vote in state 
elections for failure to pay a poll tax in Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 
(1966). 
60. U.S. CONST. amend. XXVI. 
176 CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY [Vol. 22:161 
ally undermine the national structure of proportional represen-
tation in the House of Representatives.61 
Can Dworkin defend a similar argument about undermining 
the national structure of the right to an abortion? No. It is clear 
that a natural, biological notion of a person is presupposed in the 
constitutional concept of a citizen or a person in whose welfare 
states can take a compelling interest. But there is reasonable dis-
agreement over whether states ought to be able to take a com-
pelling interest in the lives of unborn humans, even prior to vi-
ability. Asserting that treating the unborn as persons in a whole 
sense would undermine federal constitutional rights would be 
putting the cart before the horse. 
It may seem odd to suggest that states have the power to 
choose to do things that would limit federal rights. But the odd-
ness here is a reflection of the misleading language used by the 
Court. The Court's language reads as though the Court gets to 
dictate exactly when states have a compelling interest in protect-
ing human life. "With respect to the State's important and le-
gitimate interest in potential life, the 'compelling' point is at vi-
ability. "62 But the Court's language here does not mean that 
states must take a compelling interest in fetuses after viability. 
Rather, the Court has told states when they may choose to take a 
compelling interest in human life. "If the State is interested in 
protecting fetal life after viability, it may go so far as to proscribe 
abortion during that period, except when it is necessary to pre-
serve the life or health of the mother. "63 
The important point here is that if a state chooses to do 
what Roe allows it to do, it does not undermine any federal con-
stitutional rights. That is, if a state balances its interest in fetal 
life, an interest that it may choose to find compelling, against 
women's fundamental liberty interest in controlling whether to 
bear children, it simply shapes or limits constitutional rights as 
the Court says they may be shaped or limited.64 As long as states 
61. Proportional representation is guaranteed by the U.S CONST. art. I, § 2, 
amended by U.S. CONST. amend. XIV,§ 2. See Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1 (1964). 
62. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 163 (1973). 
63. Id. at 163-64 (emphasis added). 
64. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003) (upholding race-based affirmative 
action on the ground that states have a compelling interest in providing diversity in edu-
cational settings, but not, of course, requiring states to take a compelling interest in diver-
sity); see also Coalition for Econ. Equal. v. Wilson, 122 F.3d 692, 7r:B (9th Cir. 1997) 
("The Constitution permits the people to grant a narrowly tailored racial preference only 
if they come forward with a compelling interest to back it up .... To hold that a democ-
ratically enacted affirmative action program is constitutionally permissible because the 
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can take a compelling interest in protecting the life of the un-
born whenever they are ready to treat the unborn as persons "in 
the whole sense," that point applies just as well to regulations 
governing the abortion of pre-viable fetuses as to regulations 
governing the abortion of post-viable fetuses. 
Ultimately, Roe's weakness derives from the fact that it 
provides no firm ground for saying that states are constitution-
ally prohibited from taking a compelling interest in the lives of 
unborn humans, even from conception. Roe's ground for deny-
ing that Texas and other states could prohibit abortion prior to 
viability was the contingent, historical-legal fact that states had 
not, at least not as of that time, treated the unborn as persons "in 
the whole sense." If that ground were to shift, and at least some 
states were to treat unborn humans as persons in the whole 
sense (or close enough to the whole sense), then those states 
should be permitted to take a compelling interest in the lives of 
unborn humans. And if they were to use that interest to shape 
and limit the right to an abortion, they would be acting just as 
states that prohibit abortion on post-viable fetuses already act 
under Roe. 
It might be objected that ultimately the Court is responsible 
for setting the limits on what a state can take a compelling inter-
est in. States cannot determine that they have a compelling in-
terest in whatever they choose to protect as if they have a com-
pelling interest in it. Imagine, for example, that a state wanted to 
take a compelling interest in the welfare of animals and treat 
their killing as on a par with the killing of humans. Could a state 
then limit federal constitutional rights as a result? Here's a test 
case that makes if fairly clear it could not. Suppose the state 
wanted to give the death penalty for the aggravated, malicious 
killing of animals.65 It seems clear that if the Eighth Amendment 
does not allow a state to give the death penalty for the rape of a 
woman,
66 then it likewise would not allow a state to give the 
death penalty for the killing of an animal. No matter how much a 
state cares about animal life, it does not have a compelling inter-
est in animal life for the purposes of the federal Constitution. It 
is not up to the state to elevate the killing of an animal to be on a 
par with the killing of a human, and the death penalty is reserved 
people have demonstrated a compelling state interest is hardly to hold that the program 
is constitutionally required. The Fourteenth Amendment, lest we lose sight of the forest 
for the trees, does not require what it barely permits.") 
65. I am grateful to Thomas Ulen for raising this issue with me. 
66. See Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977). 
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for the killing of humans. Likewise, we could imagine that there 
is a reason the federal Unborn Victims of Violence Act does not 
allow the death penalty for the killing of unborn humans: it 
would be unconstitutional because the Constitution does not al-
low states, or the federal government, to treat unborn humans as 
persons in the whole sense. 
A proper response has to admit that the Court does have 
the ultimate authority and responsibility to determine whether a 
state can take a compelling interest in something. Moreover, it is 
surely true that a state cannot acquire a compelling interest sim-
ply by acting as thought it takes one. Having a compelling inter-
est does not imply taking one, but it is a necessary condition for 
taking one. Nevertheless, there is a middle space between those 
things that a state clearly has a compelling interest in and those 
things that a state clearly does not have a compelling interest in. 
In that middle space, I think Roe was right to look to the actual 
behavior of the states. In that middle space, if a state acts as 
though it takes a compelling interest in something generally, that 
should support its claim to take a compelling interest in that 
thing in a particular, narrow context. Likewise, if a state does not 
generally act as though it takes a compelling interest in some-
thing, that should undermine its claim to take a compelling in-
terest in that thing in a particular, narrow context. The status of 
the life of unborn humans is a prime candidate to fall in this 
middle space. 
It may seem that this argument has come too late. It has 
been settled law for over thirty years now that states do not have 
a compelling interest in the lives of the unborn prior to viability. 
The ground on which Roe sat may have been soft, but time can 
turn such soft ground firm.67 But as the Court noted in Casey, "it 
is common wisdom that the rule of stare decisis is not an 'inexo-
rable command. "'68 A number of things have to be true for stare 
decisis to govern a case. Among the relevant conditions for ap-
pealing to stare decisis in defense of Roe is, as the Court said in 
Casey, that "[n]o evolution of legal principle has left Roe's doc-
trinal footings weaker than they were in 1973."69 The problem 
67. See, e.g., Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 443 (2000) (upholding the 
decision in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), because the warnings based on that 
case "have become part of our national culture," and because the doctrinal underpin-
nings of the case are still sound). 
68. Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 854 
(1992). 
69. /d. at 857. 
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for Roe is that the doctrinal footing rests on two feet. One foot is 
the claim that a woman has a fundamental liberty interest in 
choosing whether to bear a child. That foot is still strong. But the 
other foot is the claim that states do not have a compelling inter-
est in the lives of unborn humans. My point here is that the 
changing behavior of states and the federal government may in-
deed leave this part of Roe's doctrinal footing weaker than it was 
in 1973. 
In sum, the crucial premise for Dworkin is that states are 
constitutionally prohibited from taking a compelling interest in 
human life prior to viability. What makes Dworkin's argument at 
all plausible is the thought that states have been told that they 
lack a compelling interest in the welfare of human life prior to 
viability. But if the issue is shoring up the claim that states may 
not take, and thereby gain, a compelling interest in the welfare 
of human life prior to viability, it simply begs the question to ar-
gue as Dworkin does that by doing so states would overrule the 
federal constitutional order. 
I conclude that Roe is vulnerable to a motion for reconsid-
eration if and when states can demonstrate that they treat, or 
come sufficiently close to treating, the unborn, at some stage 
prior to viability, as persons more or less "in the whole sense." If 
Roe is reconsidered in this light, then any constitutional protec-
tion for abortion rights would have to be framed so that those 
rights are well grounded even if states do have, and do take, a 
compelling interest in the lives of unborn humans, even prior to 
viability.70 
70. I addressed this issue in an earlier piece, and stand by my discussion there. See 
Walen, supra note 19. 
